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COMMENTS
THE SUPREME COURT CREATES NEW
HURDLE FOR LIBEL DEFENDANTS: DUN
& BRADSTREET, INC. v. GREENMOSS
BUILDERS, INC.
The Supreme Court's first amendment methodology in the law
of defamation strikes a balance between the states' interest in
compensating individuals for injury to their reputation,' and the
' See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966); L. ELDREDGE, THE

§ 2,

LAW OF DEFAMATION

at 2-3 (1978); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984);
Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1351-52 (1975).
Defamation has been defined as the "unconsented and unprivileged communication to a
third party of a false idea which tends to injure plaintiff's reputation by lowering the community's estimation of him, or by causing him to be shunned or avoided, or by exposing him
to hatred, contempt or ridicule." A. HANSON, LBEL AND RELATED TORTS: CASE & COMMENT
21-22 (1969). It is composed of the torts of libel and slander. See W. PROSSER & W. KEzroN,
supra, § 112. Libel consists of written, defamatory statements and other defamatory communications, such as movies, which are embodied in a permanent physical form. See id. at
786-87; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568A (1977). Slander consists of defamatory
statements which are spoken. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra, § 112, at 786. A third
category of defamation recognized by some courts is the "defamacast," which is defined as a
communication by radio or television. See American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc.
v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230, 235, 126 S.E.2d 873, 879 (1962); L. ELDREDGE, supra, § 13, at
81-86. Libel, because of its permanent form, is considered likely to cause injury, and, therefore, is actionable per se. W. PROSSER & W. kEETON, supra, § 112, at 795. Damage to reputation is presumed from the defamatory statement, and the plaintiff is not required to offer
proof of impairment to reputation. See id. Slander, on the other hand, is not actionable
unless the plaintiff offers proof of actual damage. Id. at 788. Certain categories of speech,
however, are actionable per se because of their deleterious nature. Id. Speech that is slanderous per se includes words which impute a criminal offense, a loathsome disease, unchastity to a woman, and words which tend to harm a person's business reputation. See id.; A.
HANSON, supra, § 47, at 46.
At common law, one who intentionally published a defamatory statement was held
strictly liable for resulting injury to reputation regardless of whether the defendant believed
the statement to be true or whether the defendant exercised due care to ascertain the truth.
See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra, § 113, at 802, 804. Although truth is a complete
defense to an action in common law defamation, see L. ELDREDGE, supra, §§ 63-71, the
burden of proving truth is on the defendant, id. § 63, at 322-23.
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2
public's interest in freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
Over the past two decades, the Court has attempted to accommodate these competing interests through the development of a con4
stitutional privilege to defame.' In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
the Court set forth the constitutional limitations on the ability of a
private person to recover damages for defamation. 5 Private individuals must prove that the defamatory statement was made with
some degree of fault and may not recover presumed or punitive
damages unless such speech was made with knowing or reckless
falsity.' While most defamation cases invoking first amendment

2 The guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press are embodied in the first
amendment, which provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law.. . abridging
the freedom of speech,.or of the press ....
." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The first amendment
has been applied to the actions of state governments through the Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958);
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
3 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times,
the Supreme Court, for the first time, recognized that the power of a state to impose sanctions on false and defamatory speech conflicts with the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Id. at 256. The Court extended protection to defamatory
statements concerning the official conduct of public officials if the statements were made in
good faith. Id. at 279-80. Constitutional protection was later extended by the Court to protect statements made about public figures, see Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967), and eventually to defamatory speech concerning private citizens, see Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see also infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text (general
discussion of development of constitutional privilege). See generally Eaton, supra note 1, at
1364-1451 (tracing development of constitutional privilege); Del Russo, Freedom of the
Press and Defamation: Attacking the Bastion of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 25 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 501, 505-11 (1981) (reviewing privilege up until Gertz); Broshnahan, From New
York Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch.- Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and
the First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777 (1975) (general overview of constitution and
libel).
' 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
' See id. at 339-43; infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. The Gertz Court extended a lesser degree of protection under the first amendment to defamatory speech concerning private individuals because such persons lack effective opportunities to rebut false
statements and are therefore more vulnerable to injury. 418 U.S. at 344. For a general treatment of the Court's decision in Gertz, see Note, Defamation Law in the Wake of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.: The Impact on State Law and the First Amendment, 69 Nw. U.L. REv.
960 (1975); Note, ConstitutionalLimitations on Libel Actions, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 79 (1976);
Comment, Libel Actions by Private Individuals, 88 HARv. L. REV. 139 (1974).
6 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-50. The Gertz Court allowed the states to decide for themselves an appropriate standard of liability, as long as they do not impose liability without
fault. Id. at 347; see infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. While most state courts have
adopted a negligence standard for defamation actions involving private plaintiffs, see, e.g.,
Troman v. Wood, 62 IlM.2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975), others have imposed a stricter fault
standard, see, e.g., Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341
N.E.2d 569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975) (plaintiff must show "that the publisher acted in
a grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of information
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protection involved media defendants, it remained uncertain
whether the Gertz privilege applied only to expressions made publicly by the media or whether it applied to nonmedia speech as
well.7 Recently, in Dun & Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc.,8 the Supreme Court, in an attempt to further define the contours of the constitutional defamation privilege, held that the first
amendment permits the recovery of presumed and punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice if a defamatory communication does not involve a matter of public concern9
In Dun & Bradstreet,the defendant, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., a
credit reporting agency, issued a credit report to five subscribers
stating that the plaintiff, Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (Greenmoss),
had filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. 10 The report was
false and greatly misrepresented Greenmoss' financial status."
gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties"). See generally Collins and Drushal, The Reaction of State Courts to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 28 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 306 (1978)(surveying standards adopted by state courts).
Compare Schomer v. Smidt, 113 Cal. App. 3d 828, 834, 170 Cal. Rptr. 6, 11
(1980)(Gertz inapplicable to non-media defendants); Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v.
Markley, 279 Or. 361, 366, 68 P.2d 1359, 1364 (1977) (same); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry.
v. Wheery, 548 S.W.2d 743, 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (same); Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d
636, 647, 318 N.W.2d 141, 153 (1982) (same) with Antwerp Diamond Exch. v. Better Business Bureau, 130 Ariz. 523, 526, 637 P.2d 733, 737 (1981) (Gertz applicable to non-media
defendants); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 588, 350 A.2d 688, 695 (1976) (same).
See generally Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1978) (constitutional protection should be granted to nonmedia
defamatory speech); Note, Mediaocracy and Mistrust: Extending New York Times Defamation Protection to Nonmedia Defendants, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1876 (1982)(protection
should be extended to non-media speech to avoid content regulation by courts); Eaton,
supra note 1, at 1405-08 (Gertz should extend to non-media speech). But see generally
Note, First Amendment ProtectionAgainst Libel Actions: DistinguishingMedia and NonMedia Defendants, 47 S. CAL.L. REv. 902 (1974)(constitutional protection should not extend to nonmedia defendants)[hereinafter cited as Note, First Amendment Protection].
8 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
Id. at 2946.
10 Id. at 2941. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., provides subscribers with reports about the financial status of businesses. Id. Subscribers, usually creditors of the businesses reported
upon, may contract for "continuous service reports" which enable them to receive all updates about a particular business over a one-year period. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 68, 461 A.2d 414, 416 (1983). Under the terms of the subscription agreement, subscribers may not reveal the information they receive to anyone else. Dun
& Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2941.
"' 105 S.Ct. at 2941. In Dun & Bradstreet,the error in the report was attributed to the
negligence of one of the defendant's employees and to the defendant's failure to verify the
report with Greenmoss. See id. at 2942. Dun & Bradstreet employed a seventeen-year old
high school student to review bankruptcy pleadings and incorporate the information into its
credit reports. Id. The employee inadvertently attributed to Greenmoss a bankruptcy petition filed by a former Greenmoss employee. Id. Dun & Bradstreet's failure to verify the
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Greenmoss was informed of the erroneous credit report while discussing the possibility of future financing with its bank,12 and it
immediately requested both a corrective notice and a list of creditors who received the report. 3 Dun & Bradstreet refused to divulge the names of the creditors but issued a corrective notice that
4
Greenmoss found unsatisfactory.
Greenmoss then filed a defamation suit in Vermont state court
and was awarded $50,000 in compensatory or presumed damages
and $300,000 in punitive damages. 5 Dun & Bradstreet moved for a
new trial arguing that under the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., recovery of presumed and
punitive damages was prohibited unless the plaintiff proved that
the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth-actual malice.' 6 Dun & Bradstreet further
contended that the jury instructions permitted recovery of presumed and punitive damages on a lesser showing. 17 A new trial was
granted, but the Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the actual malice requirement of Gertz does not apply to defamation actions brought against nonmedia defendants.' Concluding
accuracy of the report was a deviation from its routine procedures. Id.
12 Id. at 2941. The bank received the erroneous credit report by Dun & Bradstreet and
refused to extend credit to Greenmoss until the credit report was corrected. See 143 Vt. at
68, 461 A.2d at 416.
105 S. Ct. at 2941.
14 Id. at 2941-42. Dun & Bradstreet refused to divulge the names of those who had
received the report because of the firm's policy that such information be kept strictly confidential. 143 Vt. at 68, 461 A.2d at 417. Dun & Bradstreet notified the five subscribers that
the petition for bankruptcy was filed not by Greenmoss, but by one of its employees and
that Greenmoss "continued in business as usual." Id. at 68, 461 A.2d at 416. Greenmoss,
dissatisfied with the corrective notice because it implied that the mistake was caused by its
own error, again demanded the names of the subscribers who received the report, but was
again refused. Id. Greenmoss then instructed Dun & Bradstreet to withhold further financial data from its creditors, whereupon Dun & Bradstreet informed its subscribers that
Greenmoss' financial posture was "difficult to classify." Id.
15105 S. Ct. at 2942.
16
17

Id.

Id. The jury instructions in Dun & Bradstreet defined malice as follows: "[I]f the
[r]eport was made with reckless disregard of the possible consequences, or if it was made
with the knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity, it was
made with malice." Id. at 2943 n.3 (emphasis in original). The instructions also indicated
that the defendant acted "maliciously" if it acted in bad faith or with the intent to injure
the plaintiff. Id.
18 143 Vt. at 68, 461 A.2d at 418. The Vermont Supreme Court opined that the reasons
for constitutional limitations on recovery in libel actions are inapplicable in cases involving
nonmedia defendants. Id. In such cases "[t]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of
public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concern-
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that the credit reporting agency was not a media defendant, the
court upheld the recovery of presumed and punitive damages
under the jury instructions, thus permitting recovery without a
showing of actual malice. 19
On certiorari, a divided Supreme Court affirmed, but employed a different rationale than that relied upon by the Vermont
Supreme Court.20 While the Vermont Supreme Court focused on
the status of Dun & Bradstreet as a nonmedia defendant, 21 the Supreme Court examined the type of speech involved to determine
whether Gertz applied.2 2 Justice Powell, writing for a plurality of
three, distinguished Gertz by noting that the constitutional limitation on the recovery of presumed and punitive damages established in that case applied only to defamatory speech involving a
matter of public concern. 23 Employing the same balancing aping self-government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of self-censorship
by the press." Id. (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 366,
568 P.2d 1359, 1362-63 (1977)).
19 Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 143 Vt. at 68, 461 A.2d at 417-18. While acknowledging
that the distinction between media and nonmedia defendants is often difficult to draw, the
Vermont Supreme Court found no such difficulty in classifying the credit reporting agency
as a nonmedia defendant. The Court stated that "[tihere is a clear distinction between a
publication which disseminates news for public consumption and one which provides specialized information to a selective, finite audience." Id. at 417.
20 105 S. Ct. at 2948.
' See Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 143 Vt. at 68, 461 A.2d at 417-18.
22 See 105 S. Ct. at 2943-48.
'1 Id. at 2944-46. Justice Powell's opinion in Dun & Bradstreet was joined by Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor. Id. at 2941. A preliminary issue discussed by the plurality
was the adequacy of the jury instructions. Id. at 2942-43. Justice Powell determined that the
jury instructions, taken as a whole, permitted recovery of presumed and punitive damages
without a finding of actual malice as defined in Gertz. Id. at 2943. It was therefore necessary
for the Court to decide whether, based on the merits, proof of actual malice was necessary.
Id.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice White wrote concurring opinions. Id. at 2498 (Burger,
C.J., and White, J., concurring). The Chief Justice agreed with the plurality opinion only
upon the holding that Gertz is limited to statements which involve matters of public concern, and that the credit report in issue relates to a matter of essentially private concern. Id.
(Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice White agreed that Gertz only applies when the speech in
issue involves a matter of public concern. Id. at 2954 (White, J., concurring). Justice White
further expressed the view that both New York Times and Gertz were erroneously decided
and that the common law should apply in defamation actions brought by private citizens.
Id. at 2950 (White, J., concurring); see supra note 1 (discussing common law standard).
Justice White argued that first amendment value of free debate on public issues is not
served by circulating false facts about public officials. 105 S. Ct. at 2950 (White, J., concurring). Justice White voiced concern over the high degree of proof necessary for public figures
to recover in defamation suits, id. (White, J., concurring), and asserted that a public official's ability to counter a falsehood is inadequate to protect his reputation because
"[d]enials, retractions, and corrections are not 'hot' news, and rarely receive the prominence

1985]

LIBEL DAMAGES

proach used by the Court in Gertz,24 Justice Powell determined
that the state interest in awarding presumed and punitive damages
for libelous speech outweighed the interest in protecting speech of
private concern, therefore justifying the imposition of such damages even absent a showing of "actual malice.

' 25

After examining the "content, form and context" of the speech
in issue,26 the Court determined that the credit report was solely in
the interest of the speaker and its specific business audience and,
of the original story," id. at 2950-51 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46-47 (1971)). Justice White maintained that protection of the
press from intimidating damages liability could have been achieved by retaining the common law standard of liability but limiting the recoverable damages. 105 S. Ct. at 2952
(White, J., concurring). By taking this approach, it was argued, the plaintiff would be able
to vindicate his reputation without unduly threatening the press. Id. (White, J., concurring).
Justice White further expressed doubt as to whether the Court's limitations on recovery
of damages has protected the financial stability of the press due to the long and complicated
discovery procedures necessary to prove actual malice. Id. at 2953 (White, J., concurring).
With regard to the existence of a chilling effect on the media resulting from the imposition
of libel awards, Justice White stated, "I cannot assume that the press, as successful and
powerful as it is, will be intimidated into withholding news that by decent journalistic standards it believes to be true." Id. (White, J., concurring).
214105 S. Ct. at 2945; see Gertz, 318 U.S. at 339-48. In Gertz, the Court weighed the
state interest in compensating private individuals defamed by the media for injury to their
reputation against the first amendment interest in freedom of speech and of the press. See
318 U.S. at 339-48.
25 See Dun & Bradstreet,105 S. Ct. at 2946. Balancing the state interest in protecting
reputation against the constitutional value of speech of purely private concern, Justice Powell determined that the latter was outweighed by the "strong and legitimate" interest in
compensating individuals who have been defamed. Id. at 2945.
The plurality asserted that not all speech is of equal first amendment importance. Id.
Speech concerning public affairs, Justice Powell asserted, is the essence of self-government
and receives heightened protection. Id. at 2945-46. Certain types of speech such as obscenity, fighting words, and commercial speech, however, have received less constitutional protection. Id. at 2945 n.5.
2 See id. at 2947. The plurality in Dun & Bradstreet derived the "content, form and
context" test from Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). See 105 S. Ct. at 2947 (quoting
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48). In Connick, the plaintiff was dismissed from her position as
assistant district attorney for refusing to accept a transfer and for insubordination in the
form of distributing to other employees a questionnaire concerning office policies. See id. at
140-42. The plaintiff claimed she had been discharged in violation of her first amendment
right of free speech. See id. at 141. The Court examined the content, form and context of
the questionnaire and held that, for the most part, it was not a matter of public concern. Id.
at 148-49. The Court determined that even though one question, whether assistant district
attorneys felt pressure to work in political campaigns supported by the offices, touched on a
matter of public concern, the state's interest as an employer in promoting the efficiency of
public services outweighed the interest of the employee in commenting on matters of public
interest. See id. at 150-54. The Court, therefore, concluded that the plaintiff's discharge did
not offend the Constitution. Id. at 154.
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therefore, did not involve a matter of public concern.17 Furthermore, the Court determined that there existed no "strong interest
in the free flow of commercial information" because the report was
disseminated to only five subscribers.2 s Finally, the plurality examined the potential deterrent effect on truthful credit reporting
which might result from the imposition of presumed and punitive
damage awards and concluded that such an effect would be unlikely because credit reporting, like advertising, is solely motivated
by a desire for profit and is objectively verifiable.29
Justice Brennan, dissenting, argued that the Court, by requiring proof of actual malice to recover presumed and punitive damages only when speech involves a matter of public concern, cut
away at the "protective mantle" accorded defamation defendants
in Gertz.30 Moreover, the dissent asserted that the credit report
did involve a matter of public concern and noted that speech about
economic or commercial matters is an important part of public discourse which consistently has received constitutional protection in
the past.3 ' The dissent maintained that information about the
bankruptcy of a company is of concern to the residents of the community where the company is located and may shape citizens'
opinions about economic regulation.3 2 Applying an overbreadth
analysis,33 Justice Brennan further posited that even if the credit
27

105 S. Ct. at 2947. The Dun & Bradstreetplurality stated that speech of commercial

interest does not warrant protection when "[t]he speech is wholly false and clearly damaging
to the victim's business reputation." Id.
28

See id.

29

Id.

Justice Powell mentioned an empirical study comparing credit transactions in

Boise, Idaho, where there is no common law privilege for credit reporting agencies, with
transactions in Spokane, Washington, where there is a common law privilege. Id. The study
concluded that, in states in which no privilege existed, credit transactions were not inhibited
and the credit reporting business thrived. See id. at 2947-48 n.9.
1o Id. at 2957 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that Gertz applied to
all defamatory statements, whether or not they implicated matters of public concern. Id. at
2959 & n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 2960-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan pointed to two areas in
which the Court has rejected the notion that speech on economic matters is not of public
concern: labor relations and advertising. Id. at 2961 & n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
dissent also rejected the plurality's reliance on the fact that the credit report was sold for
profit, noting that speech does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is sold
for profit. See id. at 2961 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32 See id. at 2961-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated, "[i]t is difficult
to suggest that a bankruptcy is not a subject matter of public concern when federal law
requires invocation of judicial mechanisms to effectuate it and makes the fact of the bankruptcy a matter of public record." Id. at 2962 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22 See id. at 2962-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan applied the requirement
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report were characterized as a matter of private concern, it would
still deserve protection under the first amendment from the imposition of presumed and punitive damage awards.3 4
The Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet delineated two
broad categories of expression: speech on matters of public concern
and speech on purely private matters.3 5 Speech in the latter category receives no constitutional protection from the imposition of
presumed and punitive damages.3 6 It is submitted that the Court,
by employing this public concern-private concern distinction, completely reconstrued its holding in Gertz and reinstated a public interest standard that the Gertz Court expressly rejected. Moreover,
it is suggested that the Court created a nebulous standard to determine whether speech is a matter of public concern which will offer
little guidance to lower courts. This Comment will examine the
factors used by the Court to determine whether the speech in issue
was a matter of public concern and will suggest that the Court's
reliance on the limited dissemination of the expression is inconsistent with the Court's first amendment precedent in the law of
defamation.
DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE THROUGH

Gertz

State defamation law at one time was considered to be wholly
outside the scope of the first amendment.3 7 However, in New York
that regulatory measures that have the effect of deterring protected speech must "be no
broader than necessary to serve the legitimate state interest asserted." Id. at 2964 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that, under Gertz, punitive damages are "wholly
irrelevant" to the state interest in compensating individuals for injury to their reputation.
See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The allowance of presumed and punitive damage awards
without a showing of actual malice, the dissent concluded, is unnecessarily broad and therefore unconstitutional. See id. at 2965 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
U See id. at 2962-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that speech
about economic matters helps to improve human welfare by aiding the decision-making process that shapes our economy. See id. at 2962. (Brennan, J., dissenting). First amendment
protection is therefore necessary to ensure that such information is widely disseminated. Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also rejected the plurality's analogy of credit reporting to commercial speech or advertising. See id. at 2963 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He
argued that reduced constitutional protection in the area of commercial speech should be
confined solely to advertising--"an offer to buy or sell goods and services." Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
35 See id. at 2943-46.
'1 See id. at 2946, 2949. When the speech in issue does not involve a matter of public
concern, the plaintiff may recover presumed and punitive damages under state law. Id. at
2946.
'7 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 & n.10 (1961); Roth v. United States,
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Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court extended first amendment
protection to defamatory falsehoods to protect truthful speech
about public officials from the potential chill of common law defamation awards.38 To recover in defamation, a public official must
prove that the defamatory statement was made with actual malice,
defined as knowledge that the statement was false or a reckless
disregard for its truth.

The actual malice standard was later ex-

tended to defamation actions brought by public figures 40 and, at
354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 562, 571-72 (1942); see
also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255-59 (1952) (upholding constitutionality of state
criminal statute prohibiting libel of class of citizens).
3' See 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). In New York Times, the Montgomery, Alabama,
police commissioner brought a defamation suit against the New York Times and several
individuals who had signed an editorial advertisement published in the New York Times.
See id. at 257-59. The advertisement, published during the civil rights movement, protested
police action against black students who engaged in nonviolent demonstrations. Id. Although the police commissioner was not mentioned specifically in the advertisement, he alleged that many references to police activities would be imputed to him. See id. at 258. The
Court, denying the plaintiff recovery, established a constitutional privilege for defamatory
falsehoods concerning the official conduct of public officials. Id. at 279-80. The Court's holding was premised on the principle that the first amendment secures freedom of expression
on public issues. See id. at 269. The Court acknowledged a "national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, and that
it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on the
government and public officials." Id. at 270. Having established that speech on public issues
is constitutionally protected, the Court concluded that neither the falsity nor the defamatory nature of a statement criticizing a public official causes it to lose its constitutional
protection. See id. at 273. Recognizing that error is inevitable in free debate, id. at 271, the
Court extended protection to false statements, as long as they were honestly made, so that a
chilling effect on truthful speech concerning public officials could be avoided, id. at 277-80.
The Court rejected the common law defense of truth as inadequate to protect the first
amendment interest in free debate because a requirement that critics of official conduct
guarantee the truth of their statements would promote self censorship. See id.
39 Id. at 254. The definition of "public official" was subsequently articulated by the
Court in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). Justice Brennan stated the test to be
whether the "position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an
independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it. . .. "
Id. at 86. The New York Times privilege was also extended to statements made about candidates for public office. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971); Ocala StarBanner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 299 (1971). Lower courts defined "public official" in a
broad fashion so that almost all government officials fall under the New York Times standard. See Eaton, supra note 1, 1376-77.
40 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In Curtis, decided with Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), Justice Harlan, writing for a plurality of four,
relied upon the rationale of New York Times to extend the constitutional privilege to public
figures. See id. at 154-55. Defining a public figure as one who has thrust himself into the
"[v]ortex of an important public controversy," Justice Harlan concluded that the first
amendment interest in free speech on public issues justified a limitation on common law
strict liability in defamation actions. See id. at 155. Unwilling, however, to hold public
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one time, to actions involving any matter of public or general
41
interest.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., however, the Supreme Court
repudiated the extension of the actual malice standard to any matter of public concern.4 2 The Court distinguished defamation suits
brought by private citizens, stating that the burden imposed by
the actual malice standard was too severe in light of the state interest in compensating private individuals for harm to their reputations. 43 In addition, a public interest inquiry was rejected befigures to the high degree of proof embodied in the actual malice standard, Justice Harlan
instead enunciated an objective standard of fault akin to gross negligence. Id. A public figure could recover, according to Justice Harlan, "on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id.
Chief Justice Warren, concurring, argued that the actual malice standard should apply
to public figures as well as public officials. Id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring). He noted
that the distinction between the governmental and private sectors is often blurred, and,
therefore, many public figures who do not hold public office play an important role in shaping society. See id. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Warren argued that
the public's legitimate interest in learning about the conduct of public figures justified the
application of the actual malice standard. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
41 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44-45 (1971). In Rosenbloom, the
plaintiff, a distributor of nudist magazines, was arrested during a police operation aimed at
obscene book distribution. Id. at 32-33. The defendant, a local radio station, reported Rosenbloom's arrest and characterized Rosenbloom as a "smut distributor" and "girlie-book
peddler." Id. at 34, 36. The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan, denied Rosenbloom recovery in a defamation action brought against the radio station,
holding that the New York Times standard applies to statements that are a matter of public
concern. Id. at 44-45. Justice Brennan rejected a different standard of liability for private
individuals because, he argued, the status of the plaintiff as private does not affect the legitimate public interest in the statement in question. See id at 45-46. But see infra note 42
and accompanying text (Gertz repudiates Rosenbloom standard).
42 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz, American Opinion, a magazine published by the John
Birch Society, published an article on the murder trial of a Chicago police officer. See id. at
325. The plaintiff, Gertz, a prominent attorney, was retained by the family of the youth who
was killed to represent them in civil litigation against the officer. Id. The article alleged the
existence of a nationwide communist conspiracy against the Chicago police and portrayed
Gertz as the architect of the "frame-up" of the officer. Id. at 325-26. Gertz was referred to as
a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" who belonged to various communist organizations.
Id. at 326. In a defamation action brought against the publisher of the article in state court,
Gertz won a jury verdict which was set aside by the Supreme Court because the statements
pertained to issues of public interest. Id. at 329-32. The trial court held that, under Rosenbloom, recovery without a showing of actual malice was prohibited. Id. at 329-32. The Supreme Court, however, reversed. See infra note 43.
'" Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-46. In his opinion for the majority in Gertz, Justice Powell
balanced the state interest in compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation
and the interest in protecting free speech which was expressed in New York Times. See id.
at 345-46. Justice Powell stated that it was necessary to afford private plaintiffs a greater
degree of protection than public plaintiffs, because unlike public figures who have access to
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cause it would have forced judges to determine on an ad hoc basis
which publications are of public concern and which are not." Instead, the Court enlarged the ambit of constitutional protection, at
least where media liability was involved, to encompass all statements made about private individuals, regardless of the presence
of public interest.45 Private individuals, however, were permitted
recovery on a lesser showing than actual malice; the Court allowed
the states to define for themselves the standard of liability for private figures as long as they did not impose strict liability.46 The
the media to counteract false statements, private figures lack effective opportunities for rebuttal and are, therefore, more vulnerable to injury. Id. at 344. Furthermore, it was argued
that both public officials and public figures have thrust themselves into the public eye,
thereby assuming the increased risk of injury which results from public scrutiny. Id. On the
other hand, the Court noted, a private individual "has relinquished no part of his interest in
the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the
courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood." Id. at 345.
" See id. at 346. The Gertz Court expressed dissatisfaction with an ad hoc determination of public interest because it would lead to unpredictability in the lower courts. Id. at
343. Justice Marshall voiced similar disapproval of the public interest test in his dissenting
opinion in Rosenbloom. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. at 29, 79 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). He stated that, assuming the determination of public interest is not merely a
polling of the public's general interest in a subject, courts would have difficulty determining
"what information is relevant to self-government." Id. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"' See 418 U.S. at 347. The Court's holding in Gertz read as follows: "We hold that, so
long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." Id. Thus, the Constitution requires proof of at least negligence for a private plaintiff to recover in a defamation action against media defendants. Id.
The Court carefully stated its holding in terms of media liability by employing the words
"publisher of broadcaster." Id. Other Justices referred to the majority opinion as pertaining
specifically to media liability. See id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 355 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); id. at 362 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Eaton, supra note 1, at 1417
(rules fashioned in Gertz were meant to apply only in defamation suits against press).
16 418 U.S. at 347 & n.10. In establishing a lesser degree of fault for private figures, the
Gertz Court also elaborated on when a person becomes a public figure, thus triggering the
actual malice standard. See id. at 345. The Court recognized three categories of public
figures. Id. The first category, involuntary public figures, consists of persons who become
public figures through no purposeful action of their own. See id. The Court noted that
chances of becoming a public figure in this way are rare. Id. The second category, "all purpose" public figures, encompasses those who occupy positions of persuasive power and influence in society. See id. The third category consists of persons who "have thrust themselves
to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved." Id.
Subsequent decisions have interpreted the "public controversy" requirement for limited
public figures narrowly. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 144-46 (1979) (research scientist who is recipient of public grant not public figure); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1979) (engagement in criminal activity does not automatically trigger public figure status); Time Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-55 (1976)
(wealthy Palm Beach socialite involved in divorce suit not public figure).
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Court retained the actual malice standard to govern the recovery
of presumed and punitive damages by private plaintiffs.47
THE

Dun & Bradstreet COURT'S

REINTERPRETATION OF

Gertz

The Court in Dun & Bradstreet, without acknowledging that
it was doing so, substantially reinterpreted its holding in Gertz.4 s
The Court erroneously stated that its holding in Gertz was premised on the fact that the defamatory statements made therein
involved a matter of public concern.4 9 The Court's decision in
Gertz, however, clearly applied to all defamatory statements
whether or not they implicated a matter of public concern. In
fact, the Gertz Court, as previously noted, explicitly rejected any
inquiry into whether the subject matter of the statement in issue
involved a matter of public interest. 51 One possible reason for the
Court's reinterpretation of Gertz is that it sought to avoid basing
its holding on a distinction between media and nonmedia defendants. 52 It is submitted that the result of the Dun & Bradstreet
47 See 418 U.S. at 350. The Court's holding in Gertz eliminated the common law doctrine of presumed damages, see supra note 1, unless the statement was made with actual
malice, see 418 U.S. at 349-50. Presumed damages, according to the Court, allow the jury
too much discretion and invite punishment of unpopular opinion. Id. The Court limited
recovery to "actual injury" but defined the term broadly to include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, mental anguish, and suffering
and pecuniary loss. Id. at 350.
Gertz also prohibited recovery of punitive damages unless actual malice is established.
Id. at 349-50. The Court determined punitive damage awards to be "wholly irrelevant" to
the state interest in compensating actual injury. Id. at 350. Moreover, punitive damages
were considered "private fines" imposed by juries to punish and deter wrongful conduct. Id.
Since such fines exacerbate media self censorship, the Court concluded that the first amendment dictated their limitation. Id.
4' Dun & Bradstreet,105 S. Ct. at 2941. Both Justice White, concurring, and Justice
Brennan, dissenting, remarked on the plurality's reinterpretation of Gertz. Id. at 2952-53
(White, J., concurring); id. at 2959 & n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 2941. After having stated that Gertz applies only when the speech in issue
involves a matter of public concern, the plurality stated the issue as whether "this rule of
Gertz applies when the false and defamatory statements do not involve matters of public
concern." Id. at 2941.
10 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
5' See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
51 The Vermont Supreme Court decision denying Dun & Bradstreet constitutional protection under Gertz was premised on the fact that Gertz applied only to media defendants
and Dun & Bradstreet was a non-media defendant. See 143 Vt. 66, 70, 461 A.2d 414, 418
(1983); see supra notes 18-19. The United States Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet not
only refused to decide the issue on the basis of the status of the defendant but expressly
stated that its holding was grounded on reasoning different from that of the Vermont Supreme Court. See 105 S. Ct. at 2942.
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decision is to reduce the constitutional protection afforded the media in Gertz for defamatory statements made about private individuals by requiring that the speech involve a matter of public
concern.
SPEECH ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN: THE COURT'S
DEVELOPMENT OF A NEBULOUS STANDARD

The Dun & Bradstreet Court, by holding that Gertz applies

only when speech involves a matter of public concern, requires
lower courts to decide on an ad hoc basis when speech involves
matters of public importance. 3 It is submitted that the plurality's
examination of the "content, form and context" of the expression
offers little guidance to lower courts in making a case by case determination of whether the speech in question receives constitu54
tional protection.
In examining the content of the credit report, Justice Powell
determined that the speech involved no issue of public concern because it was solely in the interest of the speaker and its business
audience. 55 Although the content of speech may be of an economic
"' See 105 S. Ct. at 2941. The Dun & BradstreetCourt explicitly stated that its holding
did not apply to credit reporting as a class, and that each report must be examined on a
case by case basis to determine if its "content, form and context" involves a matter of public
concern. Id. at 2947 & n.8. Justice Powell's commitment to an ad hoc approach is interesting
in light of his opinion in Gertz. In that case his decision to vary the level of protection based
on the status of the plaintiff rather than the presence of public concern was made primarily
to avoid an ad hoc evaluation of content. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Dun &
Bradstreet'spublic concern test is similar to the Court's approach in Rosenbloom, see supra
note 41, except that in Dun & Bradstreetthe public concern test determines whether speech
receives the less stringent protection of Gertz, while in Rosenbloom the public concern standard triggered the actual malice standard of protection, see Dunn & Bradstreet,105 S. Ct.
at 2960 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"4 See 105 S. Ct. at 2960 (Brennan, J., dissenting). One commentator suggests that the
Court's creation of an imprecise standard based upon the public or nonpublic nature of the
speaker's statements implicates questions of procedural due process. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term- Leading Cases: ConstitutionalLaw, 99 HARv. L. REV. 120, 220221 (1985) (Constitution requires that people be informed as to what state law forbids; after
Dun & Bradstreet, no speaker can predict legal consequences of his speech).
55 105 S. Ct. at 2947. Based on the Court's reference to commercial speech, it appears
that the content of the speech in issue in Dun & Bradstreet was deemed private because it
fell within the realm of economic or commercial matters. As the dissent noted, the plurality
employed an analogy to advertising to conclude that the speech in question did not warrant
constitutional protection under Gertz. Id. at 2960 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Commercial
speech, or advertising, is defined as speech related solely to the economic interest of the
speaker and its audience. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 363-64 (1977).
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nature, it nonetheless may be a matter of concern to the public. 6
It is therefore suggested that while an inquiry into the subject
matter of speech is necessary to determine whether it constitutes a
matter of public concern, a cursory finding that speech is not of
public concern based upon its economic nature is improper.5"
Another factor considered by the plurality was the presence of
a strong profit motive in the credit reporting industry which, Justice Powell concluded, makes it unlikely that such speech will be
deterred by the imposition of presumed and punitive damages. 8 It
is submitted that the deterrent effect of damage awards should be
irrelevant to the issue of whether speech constitutes a matter of
public importance. Moreover, speech has not been denied constitutional protection simply because it is distributed for profit.5
The final and most problematic factor examined by the plurality was the limited dissemination of the credit report.8 0 The plurality reasoned that because the speech was disseminated to a limited
audience it did not require "special protection to ensure that 'debate on public issues [will] be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen.' "61 It is submitted that the Court's reliance on the degree of
11 See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S.
748, 764 (1976) (advertisements, although commercial, may be of general public interest);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-03 (1940) (anti-picketing statute unconstitutional;
labor relations not merely of local or private concern but may affect whole region and marketing system).
7 As the Dun & Bradstreet dissent noted, the subject matter of the credit report,
bankruptcy, may be of public concern in some circumstances. 105 S. Ct. at 2961-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For instance, the bankruptcy of a manufacturing plant that employs a
large percentage of the population of a community is certainly of public concern to the
residents of the community. Id. at 2961 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The report may also be of
potential concern to surrounding areas, where former employees of the bankrupt company
must turn for employment. See id. at 2961-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 2947. The argument that speech motivated by profit is less likely to be chilled
by state regulation surfaced in Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976). The Court conceded that there are "commonsense
differences" between commercial speech and other types of speech. Id. at 771 n.24. Advertisements, the Court stated, are more easily verifiable than speech on political issues. Id. at
772. In addition, advertising was considered more "durable," since it is the "sine qua non"
of commercial profits. Id. In light of these characteristics, the Court concluded that commercial speech was less likely to be deterred by state regulation. Id.
1 See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S. 748, 761
(1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35-59 (1976); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 501-02 (1952). In the context of defamation, an editorial advertisement, although published for profit, receives the highest level of constitutional protection under the actual malice standard. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1963).
60 105 S. Ct. at 2947.
61Id. The plurality's reliance on limited dissemination to deny first amendment protec-
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dissemination of speech to determine whether it is a matter of
public concern should be rejected for a number of reasons. First,
by focusing on dissemination, the Court in effect grants greater
protection to one who defames before a wider audience, and, con62
sequently, has a greater capacity to cause injury to reputation.
Second, the Court's emphasis on dissemination frustrates the
rationale for limiting state libel awards as established in New York
Times v. Sullivan and its progeny.6 3 The Court in New York
Times recognized that, for a democracy to function properly, society must be well informed about public issues. 4 The actual malice
standard was developed to protect defamatory speech criticizing
tion to the speech in issue is inconsistent with its holding in Givhan v. Western Line Consol.
School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979). In Giuhan, a public school teacher was fired after privately expressing to the school principal her disapproval of certain school policies which she
perceived to be racially discriminatory. Id. at 411-13. She filed suit against the school district claiming that her right of free speech had been violated. Id. at 411-12. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to reinstate Givhan on the ground that her speech was
not protected under the first amendment because she privately expressed her complaints.
Ayers v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 555 F.2d 1309, 1318 (5th Cir. 1977). In a brief
opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the speech in issue did not lose its constitutional protection merely because it was spoken privately. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415-17.
The Court stated, "[n]either the [First] Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that
. . . freedom [of speech] is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the public." Id. at 415-16.
2 See Garcia v. Board of Educ. of the Socorro Consol. School Dist., 777 F.2d 1403, 1410
(10th Cir. 1985); Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 933, 935. In addition to its increased capacity to
injure, the media most often has a greater ability to compensate for injury because it can
pass along the cost of successful defamation suits to consumers. See Shriffrin, supra note 7,
at 935.
63 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
6 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269; see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)
(first amendment protects free discussion of governmental affairs); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (free speech concerning public affairs is essence of self-government); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (freedom of speech must embrace all
issues to enable society to cope with exigencies of their times).
The Supreme Court in New York Times made it clear that the central purpose of the
first amendment is to provide a core of protection to political speech without which a democracy cannot function. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976); Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the
"CentralMeaning of the FirstAmendment", 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 208. Justice Brennan's
opinion in New York Times was influenced by the first amendment theory of Professor
Alexander Meiklejohn. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11-14 (1965). Professor Meiklejohn argued
that the foremost rationale under the first amendment for extending protection to speech
was to preserve its role in a representative government. See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 78-79 (1960). This theory has been criticized for its failure to define adequately what
speech is encompassed by the term "political." See Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 936-38.
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both public officials65 and public figures68 to ensure that debate on
public issues is "uninhibited, robust, and wide open. '6 7 Although
media speech significantly contributes to the goal of a well informed electorate,6 8 daily private communications are also essential to the proper functioning of the democratic dialogue.6 9 Indeed,
the courts have applied the actual malice standard to speech
widely disseminated by the media and to speech made by private
individuals.7 0 In light of the value of private speech in the discussion of political issues, it is submitted that the degree to which
speech is disseminated should not be a consideration in determining whether it constitutes a matter of public concern.
Finally, it is suggested that the plurality, in relying upon the
limited dissemination of the credit report, inadvertently created a
media/non-media dichotomy. By considering the extent of dissemination of an expression to determine whether it is a matter of public concern under the Court's interpretation of Gertz, it is contended that media speech is necessarily granted greater protection
than non-media speech.7 1 Not only has the Court carefully avoided
interpreting Gertz as a special privilege for the media,7 2 it has re11

See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
6 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
'7 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
'sSee Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It
Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 653 (1975); Note, First Amendment Protection Against Libel Actions: Distinguishing Media and Non-Media Defendants, 47 S.
CAL.L. REV.902, 925 (1974).
69See Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 932-33; accord Watkins & Schwartz, Gertz and the
Common Law of Defamation: Of Fault, Nonmedia Defendants, and ConditionalPrivileges,
15 TEx. TECH L. REv. 823, 849-51 (1984). Protection of non-media speech is necessary to
equalize the power of those who control the media and to ensure a diversity of perspectives
on issues. Dun & Bradstreet,105 S. Ct. at 2958-59 & n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting J.
BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? (1973)). Indeed, communications in family,
work, social, and peer groups profoundly affect political attitudes. See Shiffrin, supra note
7, at 933; Schauer, 'Private' Speech and the 'Private' Forum: Givhan v. Western Line
School District, 1979 Sup. CT. Rv.217, 236.
70 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). In New York
Times, the Supreme Court applied the actual malice standard to both media and non-media
defendants. Id. at 256; accord Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964). Several state courts have applied the actual malice standard to nonmedia defendants. See, e.g., Jackson v. Filliben, 281 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. 1971); Fox v. Kahn,
421 Pa. 563, 565, 221 A.2d 181, 183, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966); Wheeler v. Green, 286
Or. 99, 107, 593 P.2d 777, 785 (1979).
71 The media has been defined by its functional role in the widespread dissemination of
information on a regular basis. See Note, First Amendment Protection, supra note 7, at
925-26.
72 While Justice Powell did not address the issue, five members of the Court expressly
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fused to allow the media in defamation actions to create its own
defense by arguing that any matter it prints is necessarily of public
interest.73 It has also refused, in other contexts, to grant the media
greater first amendment protection than that of ordinary citizens.74
It is submitted, therefore, that the plurality's analysis places the
media in a preferred position contrary to Supreme Court
precedent.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Dun & Bradstreet marks a
significant departure from its approach in Gertz and further narrows the constitutional limitation on the states' power to award
damages in defamation suits. In addition to determining the status
of a plaintiff as public or private, courts must now decide on a case
by case basis whether an expression is a matter of public concern
before it will receive the limited constitutional protection afforded
in Gertz. The Dun & Bradstreet holding also does little to resolve
the issue of whether Gertz applies to non-media speakers. The
Court's consideration of the degree of dissemination of an expression indicates that some private, non-media speech will not be protected. An examination of the degree of dissemination not only
creates many practical difficulties, but is inconsistent with both
first amendment theory and the rationale for limiting the power of
refused to afford the media greater first amendment protection in defamation actions. See
105 S. Ct. at 2953 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2957 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens). Furthermore, a distinction drawn on the media
or non-media status of the defendant would generate difficulties in defining what constitutes
the "media." See Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2957 & n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Garcia v. Board of Educ. of the Socorro Consol. School Dist., 777 F.2d 1403, 1411 (10th Cir.
1985).
7' See Time Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 445-56 (1976).
71'See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169, 175 (1979) (media is not entitled to
special protection during civil discovery process); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974)
(press has no constitutional right to access to information not afforded public in general);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 702 (1972) (first amendment does not grant newsreporter
privilege from grand jury testimony).
Although the first amendment prohibits the abridgement of freedom of the press, the
Framers of the Constitution did not intend to grant the media greater protection than that
granted to all citizens. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) (Burger,
C.J., concurring). Most eighteenth century writers used the terms "freedom of speech" and
"freedom of the press" interchangeably. See Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion Amid Conflicting Approaches, 75 MicH. L. REv. 43, 57-58 (1976); Lange,
The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REv. 77, 80 (1975); Nimmer, supra note 68, at
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a state to redress injury to reputation. It is submitted, therefore,
that reliance on the content of an expression to determine whether
it constitutes a matter of public concern would be a more prudent
approach.
Janine Albergo

